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Something  rational  in  the  state  of 
Denmark? 





bilateral  treaties  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  We  attempt  to  explain  this 
through a study of the structure of Danish trade and protection. We demonstrate, in contrast to 
previous accounts that have considered Danish trade policy somewhat irrational, that Denmark 













The  network  of  bilateral  trade  treaties  that  emerged  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Anglo‐French 
Cobden‐Chevalier  Treaty  of  1860  is  regarded  as  the  institutional  backbone  of  international 
trade policy cooperation in the second half of the nineteenth century. It consisted of more than 
fifty  bilateral  agreements  between  Western  and  Central  European  countries  that  were 
interlinked  by  the  unconditional  most‐favoured  nation  clause  (MFN).  The  resulting  level  of 
political cooperation and commercial liberalisation in Europe was unsurpassed until the coming 
of the European Economic Community and forms a key component of the  idea of a European 
free  trade  era  during  the  ‘first  globalization’.  The  network  was  mainly  linked  together  by 
commercial treaties of European countries with France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy. 
An  important  outsider  to  this  story was,  however, Denmark. During  the  period of  the  rapid 
expansion  of  treaty‐making  in  Europe,  1860  to  1875,  Denmark  concluded  only  three 
commercial  treaties  with  minor  trading  partners:  Belgium  in  1863,  Italy  in  1864,  and 
Switzerland  in 1875.  In fact, by 1875  it was the only  fully  independent European country that 
had failed to sign a commercial agreement with France. 
The question might then be asked as to why Denmark failed to participate. The importance of 




the Danish “national tradition of  liberalism”  is a recurrent theme  in Danish history, and often 
considered to be a large part of the reason for her economic success (Henriksen 1993, p. 156). 
And  yet  this  did  not  seem  to  have  been  accompanied  by  a  spirit  of  internationalism,  since 
Denmark chose to stand outside the free trade network of the mid‐nineteenth century. 
2. Our approach 
While  scholars  have  recognized  the  special  role  of  Denmark  (see  for  example  the  classic 




presented.  Moreover,  when  Danish  trade  policy  is  discussed,  it  is  often  seen  as  somewhat 
irrational. Although Denmark followed others with a move towards free trade with the tariff act 
of 1863, the structure of the remaining protection seems rather illogical. This was even more so 








be obtained  from  it. Co‐operation  is marked by decisions, and not an  inescapable process of 
Weltgeist on  its way  to crown history with reason. Decisions should be  taken on  the basis of 
existing  information,  valuing potential benefits. Recent  studies of  the post‐1945 world  trade 
regime established through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) have shown that the benefits for the average member – in terms of 
increased  trade  flows  –  might  be  insignificant  (Rose  2004),  while  the  core  members  who 
established  the  rules  of  the  system  and  retained  important  bargaining  power  during  its 
evolution  gained  significantly  (Gowa  and  Kim  2005, Westermeier  2008).  Similar  results  have 
been  obtained  in  recent  studies  of  the  first  round  of  the  Cobden‐Chevalier  network 
(Accominotti and Flandreau 2008, Lampe 2009a).  
Hence, for countries at the margin, the decision to cooperate or not might make only a small 











commodities  might  be  important,  taking  into  account  the  specific  production  and  export 
structure of the Danish economy, which was basically agricultural. Since it takes two to tango or 
to conclude a bilateral treaty, we also need to consider the Danish tariff from the point of view 








exports,  and  tariff  barriers  to  both  in  order  to  examine  the  potential  gains  from  division  of 




Before 1863, Danish  tariffs were based on a  tariff  law of 1797 which,  for  its  time, was  fairly 
liberal and has been considered a clear break with Mercantilist thinking. (Scharling 1905, p. 260, 
Becker‐Christensen 1988, p. 518‐20) The process of liberalization continued over the years with 







particularly  important for the movement towards tariff reform  in Denmark. This seems  in fact 
to have had roots going rather farther back in time. (Winding 1959)  
The 1863 tariff  law, which came  into force on 1 April 1864, generally  led to  lower protection, 
although  it  was  implicitly  formulated  so  that  government  revenue  would  not  be  affected. 
(Hansen 1984, p. 193) The structure of protection after the tariff reform of 1863 has often been 
considered  to be somewhat  irrational, since  it  imposed a duty by weight on  industrial goods, 
thus offering  the highest protection  to  crude  and  simple products, which was presumably  a 
disadvantage  for  a  country  looking  to  industrialize. Moreover,  falling  prices meant  that  the 
incidence  of  this  protection was  increasing over  time  (Hyldtoft  1999, p.  182). Whatever  the 
case, the significance of the 1863  law was overshadowed by the  loss of Schleswig‐Holstein to 
Prussia  in  the war of 1864:  this meant  that  two‐fifths of  the home market was  lost  (Hyldtoft 
1999, p. 58). This made the 1863 tariffs, which seem in part to have been intended to support 





trade  agreements movement  offered  a way  to  adjust  the  tariff  law. Although  three  treaties 
were  signed,  as mentioned  above,  this  opportunity was  not  seized  since  they were  all  pure 
most‐favoured  nation  agreements,  i.e.  they  stipulated  non‐discrimination  only,  but  did  not 










Scharling wrote  in 1905 “there  is no other  land which has held back as much from concluding 
tariff treaties as Denmark in order to maintain its freedom to alter its tariff rates as it sees fit – 
and there is no other land which has been so reluctant to make use of its freedom to change its 
tariff  rates”5. The 1863  law  thus provides  the  context within which  the  choice of  the Danish 
government not to participate in the Cobden‐Chevalier network can be understood. 
The structure of Danish trade and its implications 
The  old  “customs  union  literature”  following  Viner  (1950)  suggests  that  trade  policy 
cooperation between two countries might be beneficial if it increases bilateral trade, and hence 
deepens  (bilateral)  division  of  labour  or  makes  more  product  varieties  available.  Scope  for 
increased division of  labour results from the exploitation of differences  in economic structure 
deriving  from  Ricardian  (technological)  or  Heckscher‐Ohlin  (factor  endowment)  comparative 






















Treaty‐making  involves  large  fixed  costs  of  information‐gathering,  consultation  of 
parliamentary bodies and appeasement of lobby‐groups, etc.6 Additionally, the inclusion of the 
unconditional most‐favoured nation  clause  implies  that bilateral preferences made once will 
transmit automatically to subsequent treaty partners. Both together suggest that governments 
who  are  concerned  about  (at  least)  balancing  additional  imports  with  additional  exports 
resulting from bilateral preferences will seek cooperation with countries of equal size first and 
avoid  making  preferences  to  smaller  countries  which  later  might  fall  to  bigger  ones.  Small 






domestic  exports.  Table  1  depicts  the  share  of  exports  that went  to Denmark  for  the most 
important European countries in 1857, according to their statistics, and contrasts them with the 
corresponding shares of Danish exports to these countries according to Danish statistics. From 
this,  it  is  suggested  that  the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway were  ‘large markets’  for 















Table 1: Denmark and its trade partners 
Country Share of Exports to 
Denmark (%) 
Share of Danish 
Exports (%) 
Share of Exports Denmark, 
Slesvig, and Holstein (%) 
Austria-Hungary 0.01 see note see note 
Belgium 0.13 0.15 0.57 
France 0.12 0.87 0.54 
German Zollverein n/a 8.33 (incl. ports), 
2.98 (only Prussia, 
Hannover, Lauenburg) 
41.76 (incl. ports), 
2.54 (only Prussia, Hannover, 
Lauenburg) 
Italy (any territory) 0 see note see note 
Netherlands 0.45 3.48 3.78 
Norway 17.00 18.25 9.16 
Portugal 0.40 0 0 
Russia & Finland 3.16 1.20 0.70 
Spain 0.45 0.06 0.03 
Sweden  3.38 12.89 6.57 
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom 0.73 43.78 30.34 
Sources: As in Lampe (2009b), appendix 3. 
Note: For Switzerland and the Zollverein no useful data was available for contemporaneous observers, while for the 
Russian Empire the data has been taken from British consular reports which were compiled based on Russian and 
Finnish statistics. For Portugal, exports via Porto and Lisbon have been summed up, as no proper export statistics 
existed for that year. For Austria-Hungary, the share of seaward exports given in the proper statistics has been 
multiplied with the share of exports to Denmark in the statistics of the most important port, Trieste. For Denmark, 
all European ports on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are summed up in one position whose share is 0.03% for 




Greece).  The  fact  that  the evolution of  the Cobden‐Chevalier network  took place  in  Europe, 
while other institutional arrangements (the so‐called reciprocity clause, see Bairoch 1989, p. 39) 
prevailed  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  justifies  that  in  the  following  we  focus  on  Europe.9 
Admittedly,  Heckscher‐Ohlin  gains  from  trade  were  also  conceptually  unknown  to 
contemporaneous observers and decision‐makers. Nevertheless, we can assume that they were 
                                                      




aware of  the  types of goods  they were producing and exporting domestically, and  for which 
goods domestic demand exceeded domestic  supply,  leading  to  importation. So, although  the 
exact  potential  benefits  of  division  of  labour  and  difference  in  factor  endowments  were 
probably  unknown,  governments  could  assess  “revealed  comparative  advantages”  from  the 
import and export structures of their own country, and of others. 




Table 2a: Denmark’s main exports (1865, Mio. Rigsdaler) 
Item Value Exported to 
Barley, not milled 10.5 England (53%), Norway (30%), Slesvig/Holstein (10%) 
Butter 4.0 England (63%), Norway (20%), Slesvig/Holstein (11%) 
Wheat, not milled 3.5 England (68%), Slesvig/Holstein (15%), Belgium (6%) 
Oats, not milled 2.9 England (81%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%), Netherlands (2%) 
Rye, not milled 2.6 Slesvig/Holstein (32%), Sweden (21%), Netherlands (21%) 
Bacon and ham (Pork) 2.0 England (55%), Norway (16%), Sweden (12%) 
Wool 1.8 England (66%), Sweden (19%), Norway (6%) 
Oxen, bulls and cows 1.4 Slesvig/Holstein (67%), England (21%), Lübeck (5%) 
Hides and skins, raw (not tanned) 1.4 England (35%), Slesvig/Holstein (26%), Sweden (16%) 
Seeds, Rapeseed and other oil seeds  1.3 Prussia (30%), Slesvig/Holstein (16%), Netherlands (12%) 
Wheat, milled (flour) 1.0 Sweden (60%), England (15%), Norway (9%) 
Horses 1.0 Slesvig/Holstein (57%), Hamburg (36%), Lübeck (2%) 
Seeds, other (neither oil nor linseed) 0.8 Sweden (95%), Norway (2%), Slesvig/Holstein (1%) 
Barley, milled (flour) 0.7 Iceland (36%), Norway (27%), Sweden (16%) 
Pigs 0.4 Slesvig/Holstein (73%), Lübeck (13%), Norway (6%) 
Train oil, cart grease, dubbing, etc. 0.4 Sweden (40%), Prussia (35%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%) 
Meat, sausages, entrails, and tongues 0.4 Norway (68%), Sweden (6%), England (6%) 
Peas, not milled 0.3 England (41%), Slesvig/Holstein (21%), Norway (11%) 
Spirits, which can be graded (Rum, Brandy, etc.), 
in casks 0.3 
Iceland (25%), Sweden (13%), England (8%) 
[“other destinations” 34%] 
Oil/Linseed cake 0.3 England (85%), Sweden (10%), Prussia (4%) 
Stones, raw (excl. millstones and grindstones), and 
articles thereof 0.2 
Slesvig/Holstein (63%), Lübeck (9%), Sweden (8%) 
Rye, milled (flour) 0.2 Sweden (31%), East Indies/China/South Sea (26%), Norway (13%) 
Waste, other (neither oil cake nor rags) 0.2 England (66%), Sweden (12%), Hamburg (9%) 
Bones and teeth, raw, complete, crushed, grinded 0.1 England (95%), Sweden (3%), Netherlands (1%) 





Table 2b: Denmark’s main imports (1865, Mio. Rigsdaler) 
Item Value Imported from 
Textile manufactures (including yarns), of 
vegetable fibres 
- Cotton textiles 
- Linen textiles 
- Cotton yarns 






England (57%), Hamburg (15%), Lübeck (14%) 
Textile manufactures (including yarns) of animal 
fibers 
- Woolens and worsteds 





Lübeck (33%), England (24%), Hamburg (21%) 
Wood, other (neither oak, boxwood, pockwood 
nor black popular), raw 4.9 
Norway (60%), Sweden (33%), Prussia (4%) 
Sugar, molasses, and syrup 2.5 Danish West Indies (29%), Foreign West Indies (23%), England (19%) 
Wood, wrought 2.0 Sweden (58%), Prussia (12%), Slesvig/Holstein (12%) 
Silk and Silk wares 1.5 Lübeck (44%), Hamburg (34%), Slesvig/Holstein (4%) 
Oils and fatty oils (elaines) 1.1 Russia (28%), Lübeck (16%), England (15%) 
Train oil, cart grease, dubbing, etc. 0.8 Greenland (51%), Iceland (33%), Belgium (7%) 
Iron and steel, other, wrought (neither bars nor 
rails, plates, hoops, nails, spikes, anchors or 
chains) 
0.8 
England (71%), Lübeck (7%), Slesvig/Holstein (7%) 
Iron and steel, hoops and bars 0.8 Sweden (50%), England (46%), Slesvig/Holstein (1%) 
Seeds, other (neither oil nor linseed) 0.6 Prussia (28%), Lübeck (22%), England (22%) 
Hides and skins, raw (not tanned) 0.5 Slesvig/Holstein (24%), England (22%), Sweden (18%) 
Horses 0.4 Sweden (84%), Slesvig/Holstein (11%), Iceland (3%) 
Rye, not milled 0.4 Prussia (75%), Russia (14%), Slesvig/Holstein (5%) 
Glassware 0.4 Belgium (69%), Lübeck (7%), Netherlands (6%) 
Wool 0.4 Iceland (53%), England (17%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%) 
Seeds: Linseed 0.4 Russia (47%), Sweden (18%), England (17%) 
Hides and skins, wrought (tanned, tawed, etc.) 0.3 Slesvig/Holstein (42%), Lübeck (26%), Hamburg (13%) 
Oxen, bulls and cows 0.3 Sweden (68%), Slesvig/Holstein (32%), England (0.2%) 
Fish: Salted herring 0.3 Norway (98.8%), Sweden (0.4%), Prussia (0.2%) 
Fish: Dried or salted 0.3 Iceland (46%), Færøer (42%), Norway (10%) 
Tanning substances 0.3 Sweden (53%), Norway (26%), Prussia (10%) 
Wheat, not milled 0.2 Sweden (79%), England (8%), Prussia (7%) 
Cheese 0.2 Slesvig/Holstein (62%), Netherlands (30%), Lübeck (3%) 
Iron and steel: Rails, ties, and chairs  0.2 England (86%), Netherlands (6%), Slesvig/Holstein (4%) 
Source: Values have been calculated based on the average quantities of imports for domestic consumption and 
exports of domestic production, respectively, in the fiscal years 1864-65 and 1865-66 from Statistisk Bureau (1865, 
1866); as Danish authorities did not report values or prices, these have been valued by prices for imports of 
10 
 
corresponding items in Hamburg in 1865 (Handelsstatistisches Bureau 1866). Items of wood are potentially 
overvalued in the export tables due to guesstimates on the internal composition of broad items made for pricing. 
Trade statistics in neither fiscal year report detailed accounts on textiles, the breakdown in Table 4b was made based 
on sub-category shares in imports of the corresponding items reported for 1863. 
 
We  see  that,  rather  unsurprisingly, Denmark was  an  exporter  of  agricultural  products  to  an 
overwhelming extent. Most of  these exports were  to England and  to neighbouring countries. 
Imports  consisted mainly of manufactures, especially  textiles and  iron wares,  imported  from 
England  and  through German ports,  as well  as  certain  raw materials  and  food  items mostly 
entering  from  neighbouring  countries,  Danish  possessions  (sugar  from  St.  Thomas,  train  oil 
from Greenland, and fish and wool from  Iceland), and  in the case of oils and oilseeds, Russia. 




But  if  we  believe  the  contemporary  information,  Denmark  might  be  an  interesting  treaty 
partner for Sweden and Norway, especially concerning wood and fish (salted herring). Another 
candidate might be England, although  the English market was  far more  important  for Danish 
agriculture  than  the  Danish  for  British  industrial  producers.  In  any  case,  a  bilateral  trade 
agreement would have only made  sense  if bilateral  trade was harmed by high  tariffs and/or 
preferential market  access  for  third‐country  producers  in Denmark  and  its  potential partner 
markets, i.e. substantial (and discriminatory) barriers to trade. 
Tariff barriers to trade 
We  turn  now  to  the  possibility  of  tariff  reductions.  There  were  no  discriminatory  tariffs  in 










those  established  for  revenue  purposes.  Table  3  shows  ad  valorem  equivalents  of  Danish 
specific tariffs on articles that were either important export articles of the European countries 
that  were  central  to  the  treaty  network  evolving  around  Denmark,  or  important  in  Danish 
imports and exchange with direct neighbours (i.e. sugar and salted herring).12 
 








Salted herring 3.9 
Raw hides and skins 0.0 
Wrought hides and skins (leather, etc.) 6.3 
Leather wares 4.0 
Wood and timber, unwrought (except from Finland) 3.4 
Wool 0.0 
Wollen yarn 4.4 
Woolens and worsteds 12.7 
Cotton yarn 3.2 
Cottons 9.5 
Linen yarn 4.7 
Linens 10.3 
Silk, Silk wares, and other high-value textiles 10.4 
Glassware 9.5 
Pig iron 0.0 
Bar iron and steel 3.6 
Ironware (rough) 7.7 
 
Source: Item-specific tariff revenues in 1864-65 and 1865-66 from Statistisk Bureau (1865, 1866) divided by values 
as calculated in notes to Table 4. For yarns and cloth, items in a broader category have been weighted by special 










that 25% of those textiles of vegetable fibres which are not identified as linens were of flax, hemp or linen. 
Calculations for wine, spirits, and sugar exclude Krigsskat (war tax surcharge).  
 
The results show that in general tariffs were not very high. Tariffs on foodstuffs and  industrial 
raw materials were essentially  zero, except  for a very  few  items  (like  fish, or – not  reported 
here  –  cheese).13  Tariffs on manufactured  goods were  in  the  ten  percent  range  common  in 
Europe  in  this period  (see Lampe 2008, Table 13), as were  the 3  to 6 percent equivalents on 
semi‐manufactures. The most striking exception to the “moderately low tariffs” rule were sugar 
and spirits, which were  taxed as  luxury goods, and whose  tariffs  to approximately  two  thirds 
complimented  internal  production  taxes. Additionally,  for  these  commodities,  as well  as  for 
wine,  coffee,  tea,  tobacco  and  tobacco  surrogates, war  finance  surcharges  (Krigsskat)  in  the 
range of 50% were established in 1864,14 and maintained for several decades. Hence, producers 
of the commodities subject to war surcharges should have been the most interested in reducing 
the effective  tariffs on  these  items.  Sugar,  tobacco,  tea,  and  coffee were not produced  to  a 
large extent in Europe, and colonial producers had relatively little bargaining power. However, 
wines,  spirits,  and  liqueurs were  important  French  export  products,  and  important  items  in 
French  treaty  making  since  the  Cobden‐Chevalier  treaty  (Lampe  2009a,  Lampe  2009b,  Nye 
2007, pp. 100‐105, Marsh 1999, etc.), not only with Britain, but also with smaller countries like 




and  surcharges on wines,  spirits, and  the other products,  is perfectly understandable at  first 
sight. But  still,  the budget perspective does not  tell  the  full  story about potential benefits of 
such a treaty or treaties with other countries mentioned above. In particular, failure to prevent 








entire  economy  (and,  consequently,  the  government  budget),  as  securing  of  equal  or 
preferential  market  access  might  help  economic  recovery  after  the  war,  and  long‐term 
development. 
Table 4 addresses the question as to whether Denmark suffered high tariffs abroad. As we can 
see, especially  the  important Scandinavian  trading partners did not  levy substantial  tariffs on 
Danish products. The only countries in which Danish products were subject to high duties (and 
even  prohibitions)  were  the  relatively  small  and  remote  markets  of  Portugal  and  Spain. 
Furthermore,  it  seems  unlikely  that  e.g.  Spain would  have  revoked  its  prohibition  on  barley 
imports due to bilateral negotiations with Denmark. Russia had relatively high tariffs on grains 
and bacon and ham, but was effectively more  a provider of  these  commodities  to Denmark 
than vice versa.  
 























4.6 3.4 1.7 0.0 2.9 0.9 >0.1 12.5 8.5 
prohibite
d 0.0 1.7 3.6 
Butter 4.3 1.8 1.0 2.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 27.2 5.8 36.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Wheat 
7.2 2.7 4.0 0.0 2.3 0.6 >0.1 14.9 8.1 
prohibite
d 0.0 1.4 2.8 
Oats 
4.7 3.5 1.7 0.0 3.0 1.5 >0.1 12.7 9.7 
prohibite
d 0.0 1.7 3.6 
Rye 
7.9 3.9 1.9 0.0 3.3 0.9 >0.1 17.7 8.2 
prohibite
d 0.0 1.9 4.1 
Bacon 
and Ham 7.2 0.7 0.3 2.5 6.2 1.3 0.0 24.8 14.5 48.7 0.0 4.2 0.0 
Wool, 
raw 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3 25.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Oxen, 
Bulls, and 
Cows 1.6 0.2 0.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Hides and 
skins, raw 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rapeseed >0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 >0.1 >0.1 0.1 0.0 >0.1 0.0 >0.1 0.0 
Weighted 
Average 4.5 2.4 1.5 0.6 2.3 0.7 >0.1 13.6 7.0 22.7 0.0 1.4 2.2 
Source: Specific tariff rates from Hübner (1866) in local currency converted into GBP using (Schneider, Schwarzer 
and Zellfelder 1991 and Nelkenbrecher 1867) divided by prices for imports from Denmark in British foreign trade 
tables (Board of Trade 1866). “Oxen, Bulls, and Cows” is the average of separate calculations for Oxen and Bulls, 
and Cows. “Hides and skins, raw” is the average of separate calculations for wet (salted) and dry skins. Weighted 
averages have been calculated based on Danish export values in 1865 as underlying Table 4a. The items in this table 
amount to more than 80 percent of total Danish exports as given in Hansen (1984, table 11). The weighted average 






Italy,  and  Switzerland  actually  applied  discriminatory  tariffs  in  1865,  which  were  based  on 
preferential rates for treaty partners, and non‐preferential (“autonomous”) rates for non‐treaty 
partners.  The  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  Norway,  Belgium,  and  the 
Zollverein had generalised their preferential rates by the end of 1865, so that they also applied 
to  Denmark,  although  Denmark  had  suffered  discrimination  most  importantly  in  Belgium 
between 1861 and the conclusion of the Danish‐Belgian Treaty of 1863. Russia and Spain had 
concluded treaties before 1865, but not granted any preferences  in them, so that the treaties 
only assured  its partners  future non‐discrimination. Portugal concluded  its  first  treaty only  in 




Denmark  underlying  the  ad  valorem  equivalents  in  Table  4. A  small  discrimination was  also 
given  in the rates  for  living horned cattle, while the rates on hides, skins, and meat were the 
same  for  all  countries.15  In  France,  tariffs  on  grains,  meals  and  flours  were  not  bound  by 
international treaties, and except for fresh meat, tariff rates in 1865 were the same for  treaty‐
parties  and  non‐treaty  parties  for Denmark’s most  important  export  products.16  Switzerland 
had discriminatory tariffs on important Danish products, i.e., all sorts of butter and meat (incl. 
bacon and ham), which was probably an incentive to conclude the Swiss‐Danish treaty of 1875. 





16 However, discrimination arose  from additional duties on  imports  in non‐French ships  for non‐treaty partners. 









This  overview  suggests  that Denmark would  not  really  have  been  able  to  gain  (in  terms  of 
additional  exports)  from  concluding  treaties  with  other  countries.  It  concluded  pure  MFN 




France seems  to have threatened  loss of revenue and  internal  taxation capacity, while actual 
discrimination was  relatively  low. This was most  importantly  the  case because Denmark was 
not an important exporter of manufactured goods, on which France still applied high duties and 
prohibitions  to  “non‐co‐operators”.18  Denmark’s  most  important  trade  partners,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  German  states,  had  relatively  low  and  non‐discriminatory  tariffs,  and  the 
Zollverein  and  Sweden  both  lowered  tariffs  in  1865.  Because  of  this  Denmark  enjoyed 
remarkably low barriers to the export of her agricultural products. (Hansen 1984, p. 184) When 








in  1661,  1670,  and  1824,  which  actually  referred  to  non‐discrimination  in  shipping  and 










To  investigate whether  the considerations made  in  the preceding paragraphs are  in  line with 
existing  quantitative  literature  and  theories  on  international  co‐operation,  we  make  use  of 
estimates of the determinants of cooperation in the Cobden‐Chevalier network between 1858 
and 1875 presented by Lampe  (2009b). Based on Pahre’s theory of endogeneous trade policy 
cooperation  and  related  theories  on  the  neo‐classical  “economic  fundamentals”  (distance, 
factor endowment, market size) of preferential treaty‐making (Baier and Bergstrand 2004) and 








Table 5: Determinants of bilateral MFN trade treaties, 1858-1875 
Variable Coefficient  
(robust p-
value) 
Natural 1.14  (0.002)
dLLR 0.44  (0.082)
GDPs 0.23  (0.042)
dGDP -0.67  (0.000)
MinTariff-1 3.67  (0.008)
MinPolity2-1 0.17  (0.000)
MaxPartnerPTAcoverage-1 2.56  (0.003)
Time 1.52  (0.004)
Time² -0.15  (0.008)
Time³ 0.005  (0.010) 




Source: Lampe (2009b, Table 2).  
Note: Dependent variable: Treaty (yes=1, no=0) between a dyad (e.g., Spain-Denmark) in a given year; Natural: 
inverse of log(distance); dLLR: difference of log land-labour ratios in 1857; GDPs: sum of log GDPs in 1857; 
dGDP: difference in GDPs; MinTariff-1: lagged bilateral minimum of both countries’ tariff rates in 21 commodity 
groups, weighted by the others’ export shares in these groups; MinPolity2-1: lagged bilateral minimum of both 
countries’ Polity2 scores (autocractic=low, democratic=high); MaxPartnerPTAcoverage-1: bilateral maximum of 
each countries’ treaties in force in the preceeding year multiplied by treaty partners’ import shares (excl. of exports 
to dyad partner) in 1857; time, time², time³: linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends; for details see Lampe (2009b, 
appendix 1 and 3). 
 
These  results  show  that  bilateral  welfare  optimization‐led  trade‐creation  considerations 
interacted  with  strategically  oriented  political‐economy  forces.  On  the  one  hand,  bilateral 
welfare  maximisation  resulting  from  a  potentially  large  common  market  formed  by  two 
18 
 
partners  of  equal  size  and  comparably  low  transport  costs  (distance)  were  important.19 
However, also high  (partner)  tariffs and the amount of previous  treaties concluded played an 
important part, which makes clear that there was an important element of strategic interaction 
in  the network. Notably,  and  importantly  for  the  case of Denmark,  the difference  in market 





logit( ) -4.81 + 1.14  + 0.44  + 0.23  - 0.67  + 3.67 Min( ) 
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p    
Table 6 presents the results of this exercise. We see that Denmark did actually conclude more 
treaties than the model would predict, and that the model scores fairly well  in the sense that 











Table 6: Maximum predicted probabilities of treaty-making for Denmark per (potential) 
partner 
Potential Partner Maximum odds (p) 
(and year) 
Austria-Hungary 0.13 (1875)








Sweden & Norway 0.08 (1875)
Switzerland 0.37 (1875)
United Kingdom 0.06 (1875)
Source: Calculated from the data underlying Lampe (2009b), using the coefficients of Table 5. 
 




the  bilateral  minimum  level  of  democracy  was  higher,  and  the  maximum  coverage  with 











Denmark’s  non‐participation was  thus  to  be  expected  and  seems  to  have  been  an  optimal 
policy outcome. Her main  trading partners,  such  as  the UK, were  free‐traders  in  agricultural 
goods anyway, and although other countries, such as France, might have wished for a reduction 




question  of  whether  the  structure  of  her  protection  was  rational.  As  noted  above,  many 




Clause:  The Myth  of  Trade  Liberalization  in  the Mid‐Nineteenth Century”, World  Politics  60, 
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